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:
:

Category 16

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)
(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF TEE ISSUES
1.

The State of Utah, the Utah Highway Patrol, and Officer

John Graber as an officer of the State of Utah in his official
capacity, are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
STANDARD OF REVIEW?

This matter was decided below upon a

motion to dismiss, and the material facts are not in dispute.
Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should
give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a
correctness standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).
2.

Given the plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings of fact, this Court should
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court.

STANDARD OP REVIEW:

A trial court's findings of fact are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is
only clearly erroneous if Mit is against the clear weight of the
evidence."

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

3. Defendant John Graber's actions in using force to prevent
plaintiff's efforts to resist arrest were objectively reasonable
and did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights.
STANDARD OP REVIEW:

A trial court's findings of fact are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is
only clearly erroneous if "it is against the clear weight of the
evidence.11
4.

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

John Graber is entitled to qualified immunity in that his

actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional
rights of the plaintiff.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because this issue raises only questions
of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference
and review it under a correctness standard.

City of Loaan v. Utah

Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Defendants do not believe that there are any determinative
statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought the instant action against the State of
Utah, the Utah Highway Patrol, and Trooper John Graber claiming
that Trooper Graber had assaulted the plaintiff while arresting
him.

R. 2-4.

Pursuant to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R.

2

22-23), plaintiff amended his complaint to state a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

R. 48-50, 75-80.

Defendants moved to

dismiss the amended complaint on the basis of res judicata.

R.

124-188. This motion was based upon the plaintiff's conviction for
resisting a lawful arrest by the use of unlawful force or violence
stemming from the same incident. Said motion was denied. R. 222.
This action then proceeded to a six day bench trial before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. R. 649-655. At the close of the trial,
Judge Rigtrup ruled dismissed this action on the merits. R. 678701.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on May 22, 1992, before

the trial court's written order was filed. R. 662. Plaintiff then
filed a motion for a new trial or stay.
plaintiff's

R. 704.

first notice of appeal, the trial

prepared the record prematurely.

Because of

court's clerk

While all documents filed after

the notice of appeal are in the record, they are not numbered and
are not shown on the index.
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and its
Judgment were entered on July 13, 1992. The trial court denied the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial or for a stay on July 15, 1992.
Plaintiff filed the instant appeal on July 16, 1992.

Plaintiff's

first appeal was dismissed pursuant to plaintiff's own motion.
Mehio v. Graber, Case No. 920257 (Utah Supreme Court, September 11,
1992) .
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The instant appeal was taken from the judgment of no cause of
action entered in behalf of the defendants by the trial court after
3

a bench trial.

No transcript of the evidence presented to the

trial court has been filed. Indeed, no transcript has been ordered
by the plaintiff in this matter. For this reason, the defendantsappellees submit the following findings of facts as entered by the
trial court on July 13, 1992 as their statement of relevant facts.
A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
is attached hereto as Addendum A.
1.

That on October 5, 1986, plaintiff assaulted his ex-

girlfriend Carole Jensen and her friend Vern Bliss by deliberately
engaging in unlawful and dangerous acts directed against them with
his car while traveling on Interstate 15.
2.
complaint

That Vern Bliss called the Utah Highway Patrol to file a
for assault

and reckless driving against plaintiff

arising out of the events which occurred on the Interstate.
3.

That Trooper John Graber received a call from Vern Bliss

and filled out a report naming plaintiff, Farouk Mehio, as the
perpetrator.
4.

That Trooper John Graber later called Carole Jensen at

home to obtain further information for his report.
5.

That upon talking with Carole Jensen, Trooper Graber was

reasonably concerned from the statements and demeanor of Ms. Jensen
that plaintiff would attempt to harm Carole Jensen that afternoon.
6.

That Trooper Graber decided to finish filling out his

report in person at the residence of Carole Jensen, arriving in the
late afternoon.
7. That while Trooper Graber was interviewing Carole Jensen,
4

Trooper Graber learned that plaintiff was prone to erratic, violent
behavior, and that he claimed to be a Black Belt in Karate.
8. That while Trooper Graber was at the residence, plaintiff
arrived and began knocking loudly at the front door of the
residence.
9.

That when the front door was opened, the plaintiff burst

into the apartment in a boisterous upset manner and approached
Carole Jensen.
10.

That Trooper Graber reasonably perceived an immediate

threat to his own safety and to the safety of Carole Jensen.
11.

That

Trooper Graber had probable

cause

to arrest

plaintiff for aggravated assault and reckless driving.
12.

That Trooper Graber, dressed in his Utah Highway Patrol

uniform, interposed himself between plaintiff Farouk Mehio and
Carole Jensen and placed Mehio under arrest.
13.

That Trooper Graber put plaintiff Farouk Mehio against

the wall of the apartment in an attempt to take him into custody
and frisk him to prevent injury to Carole Jensen or to himself.
14.

That plaintiff pulled away from Trooper Graber and

committed the separate crime of resisting arrest by attempting to
leave the scene through the front door of the apartment.
15.

That Trooper Graber followed plaintiff Farouk Mehio out

into the hallway, ordering him to stop and to not resist arrest.
16.

That Trooper Graber put plaintiff against the wall

opposite Carole Jensen's apartment# holding him there while trying
to handcuff and subdue him.

5

17.

That plaintiff again resisted arrest, broke free and

attempted to leave the scene.
18.

That Trooper Graber finally forced plaintiff to the

ground, cuffed his hands behind his back and kept him there until
backup officer Don Christensen arrived.
19.

That in the course of the struggle, plaintiff received

some minor abrasions on his forehead, shoulder and knee and had
force exerted upon him to take him into custody and prevent him
from resisting arrest.
20.

That

Trooper

Graber

used

standard

techniques

acted

in an appropriate

in

attempting to subdue this suspect.
21.

That

Trooper

Graber

and

reasonable manner and used reasonable force in subduing plaintiff.
The plaintiff, Farouk Mehio, had been charged criminally
with resisting a lawful arrest by the use of unlawful force or
violence stemming from this same incident.

R. 142.

convicted of this crime in the Third Circuit Court.
appeal, Mehio's conviction was affirmed.

He was

R. 140.

On

R. 144-146.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol are not
"persons" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot
therefore, be sued under that statute for any reason.
individual

defendant,

Trooper

John

Graber,

in

his

The

official

capacity, cannot be sued for damages in a civil rights action
because he is not a 'person' as that term is used.

A state

officer, in his official capacity, can only be sued for prospective

6

relief.
While the plaintiff challenges that factual findings of the
trial court, he does not marshal the evidence in support of the
findings.

Because the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of

marshaling the evidence, the court should assume that the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court.
Plaintiff

resisted a lawful arrest attempt by means of

unlawful force or violence. Officer John Graber's use of force to
overcome plaintiff's attempts to resist arrest were objectively
reasonable and did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.

Graber's actions did not violate any clearly established

constitutional right of the plaintiff and Graber is therefore
entitled to qualified immunity.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH
PATROL, AND OFFICER JOHN GRABER
'OFFICIAL CAPACITY' ARE NOT 'PERSONS'
TO 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 SUCH AS CAN BE
STATE COURT

HIGHWAY
IN HIS
PURSUANT
SUED IN

Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal civil rights and
seeks recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

It is clearly

established law that neither the State of Utah, the Utah Highway
Patrol, or their officers in their "official capacities" are
"persons"

pursuant

to

§1983

and

cannot

therefore

be

sued

thereunder.
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court made it
abundantly clear that the several states cannot be sued under §1983
in state courts.

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police. 109
7

S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Court held that the State of Michigan and
its department of state police could not be sued in Michigan State
Court for civil rights violations.
Our conclusion is further supported by our
holdings that in enacting § 1983, Congress did
not intend to override well-established
immunities or defenses under the common law.
"One important assumption underlying the
court's decisions in this area is that members
of the 42nd Congress were familiar with
common-law principles, including defenses
previously
recognized
in
ordinary
tort
litigation, and that they likely intended
these common-law principles to obtain, absent
specific
provisions
to
the
contrary.11
(Citations omitted).
The doctrine of
sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at
common law. "The principle is elementary that
a State cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent," It is an "established
principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign
cannot be sued in its own courts without its
consent. We cannot conclude that §1983 was
intended to disregard the well-established
immunity of a State from being sued without
its consent.
109 S.Ct. at 2309-2310, citations omitted.

The State of Utah has

expressly declared that it does not waive its immunity as to civil
rights claims.

§63-30-10 (1) (b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

Therefore, the State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol were
properly dismissed from this federal civil rights action.
The United States Supreme Court has continuously held that the
states are not subject to actions, regardless of the nature of the
relief sought. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234,
105 S.Ct. 3142, reh. den. 106 S.Ct. 18 (1985); Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89, (1984); Florida
Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Association. 450 U.S.
8

147 (1981); Alabama v. Puorh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933).

Indeed, Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S.

159 (1985) expressly held that the State of Kentucky could not be
brought into a damages action against one of its employees for the
sole purpose of an award of attorneys fees.
The Court in Will also addressed the question of whether or
not official capacity actions for damages could be maintained
against state officials in state court pursuant to § 1983.
Obviously, state officials literally are
persons. But a suit against a state official
in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit
against the official's office. As such, it is
no different from a suit against the State
itself. We see no reason to adopt a different
rule in the present context, particularly when
such a rule would allow petitioner to
circumvent congressional intent by a mere
pleading device. We hold that neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are "persons" under §1983.
109 S.Ct. at 2311-2312, citations and footnote omitted.

For this

reason, the instant action, as far as it sought to hold Trooper
John Graber liable for damages in his official capacity, was
properly dismissed as well.
II.
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THIS COURT SHOULD
ASSUME THAT THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS
In considering Mr. Mehio's arguments on the evidence, the
appellate court should begin its analysis with the trial court's
findings of fact and not with Mr. Mehio's assertions as to what the
evidence was or should have been.
1184 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted).
9

Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182,

The district court's findings of fact are
based upon a judgment of the credibility of
the witnesses.
It is the province of the
trier of fact to assess the credibility of
witnesses, and we will not second-guess the
trial court where there is a reasonable basis
to support its findings.
In order to
challenge the court's findings of fact, the
defendant must marshal all of the evidence in
favor of the findings and then demonstrate
that even when reviewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the
findings.
Mr. Mehio
marshalling

has

failed

to meet

the evidence and showing

this
that

burden.

Far

the trial

from

court's

findings of fact (set out fully in the statement of relevant facts,
supra) are not supported by the evidence, plaintiff has failed to
even provide the court with the evidence. No transcript of the six
day bench trial has been ordered by the plaintiff.

R. 702.

Plaintiff's brief does not seek to set forth how Judge Rigtrup's
findings

of

fact

are

incorrect,

but

is

instead

a verbatim

repetition of the plaintiff's pre-trial brief (R. 610-616) with no
reference to the evidence that was adduced at trial.
An appellate court does not lightly disturb
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of fact
made by a trial court. If a challenge is made
to the findings, an appellant must marshal all
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the
trial court and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the
court below,
the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings of fact.
If appellant fails to marshal the evidence,
the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application
of that law in the case.
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . Because the
10

plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings of fact, the defendants ask that this Court
assume said findings are supported by the record and affirm the
correctness of the trial court's factual findings.
III.
DEFENDANT JOHN GRABER'S ACTIONS WERE
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE AND DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OP THE PLAINTIFF
In Graham v. Connor. 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court determined what constitutional standard governs a
free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive
force in making an arrest.

Graham involved a civil rights action

by a diabetic who alleged that he had been injured by the excessive
use of force by officers.
Today we make explicit what was implicit in
Garner's analysis, and hold that all claims
that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force - deadly or not - in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other "seizure" of a free citizen should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
"reasonableness" standard, rather than under a
"substantive due process" approach.
109 S.Ct. at 1871 (emphasis in original).

In explaining the

"reasonableness" standard, the Court said:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
. . .
The calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers
are often forced to make split-second
judgments - in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the
amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.
As in other Fourth Amendment contexts,
however, the "reasonableness" inquiry in an
excessive force case is an objective one: the
11

question is whether the officers' actions are
"objectively reasonable" in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without
regard
to
their
underlying
intent
or
motivation.
109 S.Ct. at 1872 (citations omitted). A short review of the
applicable findings of fact made by the trial judge demonstrates
the objective reasonableness of Trooper Graber's conduct in the
instant action.

Mehio had assaulted Carole Jensen and Vern Bliss

by his reckless driving earlier that day.

While the officer was

interviewing Ms. Jensen, Farouk Mehio began knocking loudly at the
front door of Jensen's apartment. When the front door was opened,
Mehio burst into Jensen's apartment in a boisterous and upset
manner, and approached Carole Jensen.
Officer John Graber's use of force in arresting Mehio was not
objectively unreasonable. Trooper Graber used standard techniques
in his effort to subdue Mehio.

The amount of force that Officer

Graber had to use was increased by Mehio's efforts to resist
arrest. Mehio had been previously convicted of resisting a lawful
arrest by the use of unlawful force or violence. Defendants submit
that Judge Rigtrup's determination that defendant Graber's conduct
was objectively reasonable is supported by the record and should be
affirmed on appeal.

The transcript

of Judge Rigtrup's oral

findings makes it clear that the trial court applied the correct
standard of objective reasonableness to the factual questions
before him.

R. 678-701.

A trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.

This Court has stated that a finding is not
12

clearly erroneous unless

"it is against the great weight of

evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly
convinced that a mistake has been made."
P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989).

Bountiful v. Riley. 784

That is not the case here.

The

weight of the evidence supports the finding that Officer Graber's
conduct was objectively reasonable.
IV.
DEFENDANT JOHN GRABER IS ENTITLED TO
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER THE STANDARD SET
FORTH IN HARLOW V. FITZGERALD.
During the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has
emphasized the important role played by qualified immunity in
disposing

of

civil

rights

claims against

state

and

federal

officials before trial. Recognizing that litigation against state
officials under §1983 poses a significant risk of deterring public
officers from the proper discharge of their official duties, the
Supreme Court has provided qualified immunity to state officials.
Thus#

"insofar

established

as

their

statutory

or

conduct

does

constitutional

not

violate

rights

of

clearly
which

a

reasonable person would have known," governmental officials are
shielded from liability for civil actions for damages. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Davis v. Scherer. 468 U.S.
183, 191 (1984). The Supreme Court has described the justification
for the qualified immunity defense as follows:
Where an official could be expected to know
that certain conduct would violate statutory
or constitutional rights, he should be made to
hesitate:
and a person who suffers injury
caused by such conduct may have a cause of
action.
But where an official's duties
legitimately require action in which clearly
established rights are not implicated, the
13

public interest may be better served by action
taken "with independence and without fear of
consequences."
457 U.S. at 819, citations omitted.

The test set forth in Harlow

has come to be known as a test of "objective legal reasonableness."
See also, Anderson v. Creicrhton. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court rejected an
attempt

at

defining

established".

broadly

what

rights

have been

"clearly

The Court held that the mere existence of a clearly

established broad and general right would not be sufficient to hold
an officer liable. Explaining the clearly established law test of
qualified immunity, the Court explained:
The operation of this standard, however,
depends substantially upon the level of
generality at which the relevant "legal rule"
is to be identified. For example, the right
to due process of law is quite clearly
established by the Due Process Clause, and
thus there is a sense in which any action that
violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it
may be that the particular action is a
violation) violates a clearly established
right. Much the same could be said of any
other constitutional or statutory violation.
But if the test of "clearly established law"
were to be applied at this level of
generality, it would bear no relationship to
the "objective legal reasonableness" that is
the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity
that our cases plainly establish into a rule
of virtually unqualified liability simply by
alleging violation of extremely abstract
rights. Harlow would be transformed from a
guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading.
Such an approach, in sum, would destroy "the
balance that our cases strike between the
interests
in
vindication
of
citizens'
constitutional rights and in public officials'
effective performance of their duties," by
making it impossible for officials "reasonably
[to] anticipate when their conduct may give
14

rise to liability for damages." Davis. supra
at 195. [footnote omitted.] It should not be
surprising,
therefore,
that
our
cases
establish that the right the official is
alleged to have violated must have been
"clearly
established"
in
a
more
particularized, and hence more relevant,
sense:
The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that
an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful, see
Mitchell, supra. at 535, n. 12; but it is to
say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. . at 639-640, emphasis added.

Anderson makes clear that the

objective reasonableness of an official's conduct does not turn on
whether the conduct subsequently is found to be constitutionally
suspect. That case involved a §1983 suit against a law enforcement
officer who had conducted a warrantless search under the mistaken
belief that probable cause existed.

The Court held that the

officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his belief in
the lawfulness of his conduct had been reasonable.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hilliard v. City and
County of Denver. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) stated that it is
the plaintiff who must show that the constitutional law he claims
has been violated was clearly established.
It is the plaintiff's burden to convince the
court that the law was clearly established.
In doing so, the plaintiff cannot simply
identify a clearly established right in the
abstract and allege that the defendant has
violated it.
Instead, the plaintiff "must
demonstrate a substantial
correspondence
between the conduct in question and prior law
allegedly establishing that the defendant's
actions were clearly prohibited." While the
15

plaintiff need not show that the specific
action at issue has previously been held
unlawful, the alleged unlawfulness must be
"apparent" in light of preexisting law. The
"contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that
right."
If the plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate that the law allegedly violated
was clearly established, the plaintiff is not
allowed to proceed with the suit.
930 F.2d at 1518, citations omitted.

In the instant action,

the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that
Defendant Graber violated any clearly established constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not cited any authority that would show that the
limited use of force in overcoming plaintiff's efforts to resist
arrest violated any established constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly dismissed this action. The State of
Utah, and the Utah Highway Patrol, cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The individual state officer cannot be sued for damages in
his official capacity.
Plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence requires this
Court to assume the correctness of the findings of fact of the
trial court.

Those findings of fact clearly support the finding

that Officer Graber's conduct met the objectively reasonable test.
Officer Graber did not violate the rights of Farouk Mehio. Even if
there was a question, Officer Graber would be entitled to qualified
immunity in this matter.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be
16
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affirmed,
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1992

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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